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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE S1~A,.fE OF UTAH 
~f.A_R\'" .A?\1 11~LJA WOOD, HAZEL 
NTEVENS, LLOYD WARNER-
Guardian Ad Litem for 
~ ancy Louise Ovard, 
\V AYNE JOHN STERLING, and 
DEAN J. HADFIELD, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
\V ALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General of Utah, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9521 
BRIEF OF AP'P·ELLANT 
N.A_TURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a peremptory writ of man-
damus issued by the Third Judicial District Court, com-
pelling Attorney General Walter L. Budge to pay cer-
tain moneys to respondents. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE 
The Third Judicial District Court granted respond-
ents' petition for 'Yrit of mandamus and issued a writ 
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compelling Attorney General Walter L. Budge to pay 
certain sums to respondents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant requests that the Court find that (1) a 
peremptory writ of mandamus is not a proper remedy 
in this action, there being a proper remedy at law; (2) 
that in any event Article VII, Section 13 of the Utah 
Constitution precludes the Attorney General from pay-
ing claims which have been denied by the Board of Exam-
iners and subsequently approved by the Legislature. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents, and others not mentioned in the 
petition, had their respective claims denied by the Utah 
Board of Examiners. (See Ex. D-2.) The Board of Ex-
aminers is a constitutional body consisting of the Gover-
nor, Secretary of State and Attorney General, who have 
vested in them, by virtue of _A_rticle VII, Section 13 of the 
Utah Constitution, the power to examine, consider and act 
upon all claims against the State of Utah. (R. 35-36) 
The 34th Legislature, on March 9, 1961, subsequently 
allowed all of respondents' claims 'vhich had been denied, 
and others. The Legislature then appropriated the nec-
essary amounts to pay the claims (Chapter 185, Section 
13, Item 126, Laws of Utah 1961), and directed Attorney 
General Walter L. Budge to pay the same. (R. 34) 
On June 26, 1961, Walter L. Budge, Attorney Gen-
eral, issued an opinion concerning 'vhether or not Article 
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VII, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution gives the State 
Legislature the power to overrule the decisions of the 
Board of Examiners with respect to unliquidated claims 
against the State of Utah. His conclusions were as 
follows: 
''The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has at 
no time passed upon the specific question set forth 
and for 'vhich an opinion has been requested. Case 
law has been carefully studied from other juris-
dictions whose constitutional provisions with rela-
tion to the duties of the Board of Examiners are 
similar to those of the State of Utah, and as is 
seen from the foregoing opinion, there is much un-
certainty as to the law covering this subject 
matter. 
''It is my opinion that no claim should be paid 
without a court clarification of the question as 
presented. Therefore, as the Attorney General of 
the State of Utah, I feel it my duty to refuse to 
dispense any appropriated funds to pay claims 
that have been denied by the Utah State Board of 
Examiners and subsequently allowed by the Utah 
State Legislature until the law appertaining there-
to is clarified by court determination.'' ( R. 36) 
On July 13, 1961, respondents filed a petition for a 
writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah to compel the Attorney General, Walter L. Budge, 
to pay the herein mentioned claims. The petition was 
denied by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, and 
thereafter, on July 18, 1961, respondents filed another 
writ of mandamus in the Third District Court of the State 
of Utah. (R. 28) On this same date the Honorable A. H. 
Ellett granted an alternative writ of mandamus, wherein 
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the appellant, Walter L. Budge, was commanded to 
either issue proper warrants to each of said parties, or 
to show cause before the Court on the 27th day of July, 
1961, at 10:00 a.m. why he had not done so. (R. 28, 29) 
On July 28, 1961, the Court of the Third Judicial Dis-
trict issued a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering 
appellant, Walter L. Budge, to pay to the respondents 
certain sums of money, and commanded appellant Walter 
L. Budge to make known to the above entitled Court, on 
the 16th day of August, 1961, how he had executed this 
writ. The Court also denied appellant's motion to dis-
miss which asserted that a writ of mandamus was not the 
proper remedy in this action. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
A PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS NOT 
THE PROPER REMEDY IN THIS ACTION BE-
CAUSE THERE IS A PROPER REMEDY AT 
LAW, AND THE DUTY OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL TO PAY THE CLAIMS IS NOT CLEAR. 
PoiNT II. 
THE TOTAL CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF 
THE UTAH BOARD OF EXAMINERS RESPECT-
ING THEIR POWER OVER CLAIMS AGAINST 
THE STATE OF UTAH ARE NOT CLEARLY 
DEFINED, AND COURT DETERMINATION IS 
NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR 
NOT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, UNDER AR-
TICLE VII, SECTION 13, UTAH STATE CONSTI-
TUTION, HAS AUTHORITY TO PAY CLAIMS 
4 
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WHICH HAVE BEEN DENIED BY THE BOARD 
OF EXAMINERS AND SUBSEQUENTLY AP-
PROVED BY THE LEGISLATURE. 
PoiNT III. 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS REPEAT-
EDLY INTERPRETED ARTICLE VII, SECTION 
13 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AS VESTING 
GREAT POWER AND DISCRETION IN THE 
BOARD OF EXAMINERS TO EXAMINE, CON-
SIDER AND PASS UPON CLAIMS AGAINST 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
PoiNT IV. 
THE UTAH BOARD OF EXAMINERS HAS 
GREATER POWER ON UNLIQUIDATED CLAIMS 
THAN ON CLAIMS UPON WHICH THE LEGIS-
LATURE HAS ALREADY MADE AN APPRO-
PRIATION. 
PoiNT V. 
THE CONSTITUTIONS OF IDAHO AND NEVA-
DA, IN ESSENCE, ARE IDENTICAL TO ARTI-
CLE VII, SECTION 13 OF THE UTAH CONSTITU-
TION, AND THE SUPREME COURTS OF THESE 
RESPECTIVE STATES HAVE CONSTRUED 
THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AS 
VESTING GREAT POWERS IN THE BOARDS OF 
EXAMINERS OF THESE STATES. 
PoiNT VI. 
WHEN THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS HAS DE-
NIED A CLAIM ON THE GROUND THAT THE 
STATE HAS NO LEGAL OR MORAL OBLIGA-
TION TO PAY THE ALLEGED CLAIM, THE LEG-
ISLATURE, BY ALLOWING SUCH A CLAIM, 
WOULD BE GRANTING A SPECIAL PRIVILEGE, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IMMUNITY OR FRANCHISE TO A PRIVATE 
INDIVIDUAL OR CORPORATION AND, THERE-
FORE, THERE WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF 
ARTICLE VI, .SECTION 26 (16), UTAH CON-
STITUTION. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
A PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS NOT 
THE PROPER REMEDY IN THIS ACTION BE-
CAUSE THERE IS A PROPER REMEDY AT 
LAW, AND THE DUTY OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL TO PAY THE CLAIMS IS NOT CLEAR. 
The purpose of a writ of mandamus is defined in 
Rule 65B(b) (3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which reads as follows: 
''Where the relief sought is to compel any inferior 
tribunal, or any corporation, board or person to 
perform an act which the law specially enjoins as 
a duty resulting from an office, trust or station; 
or to compel the admission of a party to the use 
and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is 
entitled and from which he is unlawful! excluded 
by such inferior tribunal or by such corporation, 
board or person; * * *. '' 
The Utah Supreme Court in the recent case of Cope 
v. Toronto, 8 U. 2d 255, 322 Pac. 977 (1958), held that the 
above rule had, by decisional law, been limited to its lit-
eral wording; thus, the purpose of mandamus is to com-
pel an inferior tribunal or any corporation, board or 
person to perform an act "rhich the la'Y specifically en-
joins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. 
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The Utah Court1 has also been explicit in holding 
that in a mandamus proceeding the legal right to require 
a public officer to proceed, and the legal duty to do so 
must be free from doubt. Several other Utah cases2 
have held that a public officer will not be coerced by a writ 
of mandamus to do an official act when right of applicant 
and duty of the officer are not reasonably clear. 
In the case at bar there is a serious question under 
Article VII, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution as to 
whether the Attorney General has the right to pay claims 
against the State of Utah which have been denied by the 
Board of Examiners and subsequently approved by the 
Legislature. The particulars of this question will be 
amplified later in this brief. The Attorney General thus 
felt that before funds were paid to the respondents, this 
question should be resolved by the courts, and this is the 
only reason why he has refused to pay the claims of 
respondents. It would, therefore, seem that mandamus is 
not the proper remedy. 
PorNT II. 
THE TOTAL CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF 
THE UTAH BOARD OF EXAMINERS RESPECT-
ING THEIR POWER OVER CLAIMS AGAINST 
THE STATE OF UTAH ARE NOT CLEARLY 
DEFINED, AND COURT DETERMINATION IS 
1 Hoffman v. Lewis, 31 Utah 179, 87 Pac. 167 ( 1906). 
'2Kyrimes v. Kyrimes, 45 Utah 168, 143 Pac. 232 ( 1914); Ketchum Coal 
Co. v. District Court of Carbon County, 48 Utah 342, 350, 159 Pac. 737, 
4 ALR 619 (1916); Woodcook v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City, 
55 Utah 458,187 Pac. 181,10 ALR 181 (1920); Towlerv. Warenski, 
59 Utah 171, 202 Pac. 3 74 ( 1921). 
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NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR 
NOT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, UNDER AR-
TICLE VII, SECTION 13, UTAH STATE CONSTI-
TUTION, HAS AUTHORITY TO PAY CLAIMS 
WHICH HAVE BEEN DENIED BY THE BOARD 
OF EXAMINERS AND SUBSEQUENTLY AP-
PROVED BY THE LEGISLATURE. 
Article VII, Section 133 creates a Board of Exami-
ners consisting of the Governor, Secretary of State and 
Attorney General, with power to examine, consider and 
act upon claims. An early Utah case4 states that the 
Board of Examiners is a creature of the Constitution and 
not the Legislature. It is, therefore, clear that the Board 
derives its powers from the Constitution and not the Leg-
islature and, therefore, any legislative enactment which 
goes contra to Article VII, Section 13 of the Utah Consti-
tution, is void. 
There are certain pharses in .A.rticle VII, Section 13, 
which are not clear. The 'yords, '·They shall, also, con-
stitute a Board of Examiners, w·ith power to examine 
all claims against the State except salaries or compen-
sation of officers fixed by la,Y, and perform such other 
duties as may be prescribed by law; and no claim against 
the State, except for salaries and compensation of offi-
3
"Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor, Secretary of State and 
Attorney General shall constitute a Board of State Prison Commissioners, 
which Board shall have such supervision of all matters connected with 
the State Prison as may be provided by law. They shall, also, constitute 
a Board of Examiners, with power to examine all claims against the State 
except salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law, and perform such 
other duties as may be prescribed by law; and no claim against the State, 
except for salaries and compensation of officers fixed by law, shall be 
passed upon by the Legislature without having been considered and 
acted upon by the said Board of Examiners." 
4 Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 494, 134 Pac. 626, 631 ( 1913). 
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rers fixed by law, shall be passed upon by the Legisla-
ture 'vithout having been considered and acted upon by 
the said Board of Examiners'' need court clarification. 
The Board is given power to examine, consider and act 
upon all claims. This wording gives the Board great 
powers over claims, and makes it substantially more than 
just an auditing board, but its exact powers are not 
clearly defined. 
Article VII, Section 13, also g1ves the Legislature 
power to ''pass'' upon claims which have been examined, 
considered and acted upon by the Board. Does the word 
"pass" mean for appropriation purposes, or something 
more, and if so, what 1 Since only the Legislature can 
appropriate money, it would seem that the word ''pass'' 
means for purposes of appropriation only. 
It should be noted that there were few discussions 
concerning any of the sections of the Constitution which 
include the Board of Examiners' provision,5 and, there-
fore, little aid for clarification can be derived from this 
source. 
PorNT III. 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS REPEAT-
EDLY INTERPRETED ARTICLE VII, SECTION 
13 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AS VESTING 
GREAT POWER AND DISCRETION IN THE 
BOARD OF EXAMINERS TO EXAMINE, CON-
SIDER AND PASS UPON CLAIMS AGAINST 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
51 Proceedings, Utah Constitutional Convention 933 ( 1898); 2 Proceed-
ings, Utah Constitutional Convention 1015, 1016 (1898). 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Bateman case6 is the latest pronouncement by 
the Utah Supreme Court in which the powers of the Board 
of Examiners were clarified. The Court stated : 
''Short of capricious and arbitrary acts, the Board 
of Examiners and its administrative arm, the 
Commission of Finance, have the authority to 
examine and approve or disapprove of proposed 
expenditures * * *. '' 
The Court then got more specific as to the discretion of 
the Board in replying to Bateman's contention that 
except as to unliquidated claims, the Board has no discre-
tionary authority and can perform only on auditing func-
tion. The Court stated: 
''The question as to the extent of the power 
of Examiners has been dealt with by this 
Court in numerous decisions. They clearly dem-
onstrate that Examiners has powers beyond mere 
auditing.'' 
The Court thus realized that if Bateman's contentions 
were adopted, the Board would be relegated to an audit-
ing board, thus duplicating the duties of the State 
Auditor, and the Board would in essence be nothing 
more than a rubber stamp of the Legislature. 
The Ajax case7 is another decision which throws 
additional light on the po,vers of the Board. In this case 
a writ of mandamus issued to compel the State Auditor 
to pay bounty certificates for killing predatory animals. 
6Bateman v. State Board of Examiners, 7 U. 2d, pp. 221 and 235; 322 P. 
2d, pp. 381, 385 and 390 ( 1958). 
7Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, 77 Utah 455, 466, 297 Pac., pp. 434 and 
438 ( 1931). 
10 
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The Uintah State Bank contended that the amount of the 
bounty· was ''fixed by law'' and, therefore, there was 
merely a ministerial duty of payment by the Auditor 
and no need to go to the Board of Examiners. The Court, 
however, said : 
''The Constitution has vested in the Board of 
Examiners the power to examine and pass on all 
claims except those exempted, and the Legisla-
ture is without authority to delegate such power 
to any other board or officer.'' 
One of the clearest pronouncements by the Utah Su-
preme Court was in the Edwards case8 where the Court 
held that the Examiners must approve a claim of the court 
reporter for mileage. The Court said: 
''The powers conferred upon the Board of Exam-
iners with regard to claims against the state, by 
the constitutional provision quoted above (Article 
VII, Section 13), are general and sweeping." 
PoiNT IV. 
THE UTAH BOARD OF EXAMINERS HAS 
GREATER POWER ON UNLIQUIDATED CLAIMS 
THAN ON CLAIMS UPON WHICH THE LEGIS-
LATURE HAS ALREADY MADE AN APPRO-
PRIATION. 
In the Thoreson case9 the Legislature passed a law 
creating a legal obligation in place of a moral obligation 
concerning reimbursement for lease of school lands by 
8State ex 1'el. Davis v. EdwMds, 33 Utah 243, 93 Pac. 720 ( 1908). 
9Tho1'eson v. State Boa1'd of Examinef'S, 19 Utah 18, 57 Pac. 175 ( 1899); 
Rehearing in 21 Utah 187, 189, 60 Pac. 982 ( 1900). 
11 
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the State of Utah. The Court was careful to point out 
that on the particular facts of the case the Board had only 
ministerial duties. The exact language of the Court is 
as follows: 
''We did not hold as intimated in appellant's brief 
that the Board of Examiners is a mere perfunc-
tory body, not capable of exercising any judgment 
or discretion in matters of allowing or rejecting 
claims against the state, but held that in the par-
ticulars mentioned in this case, where the claim 
is admitted to be just, the Board had no discre .. 
tion, but their duties were mandatory. 
In short, there is nothing in the Thoreson case which re· 
stricts the power of the Board as to unliquidated claims. 
The decision of the Thoreson case, as the Court pointed 
out, was limited to the fact situation in that case. 
In a very recent Idaho case 10 in which an attorney 
was appointed by the Board of Highway Directors as 
attorney for the Board, without designation of Assistant 
Attorney General, and the Board fixed his compensation, 
an action of the State Board of Examiners in directing 
the Auditor to refuse to pay the attorney's claim, was 
held not valid. The reasoning of the court was that where 
a claim against the state is based on an obligation au-
thorized by the Legislature against a specific appropria-
tion made by the Legislature, authority of the Board of 
Examiners is limited to determining that the claims are 
in perfect form, properly certified to the State Auditor 
by the Department of High,Yays, and chargeable against 
1 0Padgett v. Williams, 348 P. 2d 944 ( 1960), Supp. Opinion 350 P. 2d 
353 ( 1960). 
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the appropriations. This ruling, however, does not apply 
where there is no prior policy determination by the 
Legislature as is the case with unliquidated claims. 
PoiNT V. 
THE CONSTITUTIONS OF IDAH0 11 AND NE-
VADA, 12 IN ESSENCE, ARE IDENTICAL TO 
ARTICLE VII, SECTION 13, OF THE UTAH CON-
STITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURTS OF 
THESE RESPECTIVE STATES HAVE CON-
STRUED THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL PROVI-
SIONS AS VESTING GREAT POWERS IN THE 
BOARDS OF EXAMINERS OF THESE STATES. 
A. Idaho Cases. The Idaho Supreme Court13 de-
fined the jurisdiction of the three branches of state gov-
ernment when it said: 
''The Legislature has no more jurisdiction to di-
rect or control the actions of the Board than the 
court has, since all three bodies, the Legislature, 
the Board of Examiners and the Supreme Court, 
derive their respective powers from the same 
instrument.'' 
The Idaho Supreme Court 14 in speaking of the dis-
cretionary powers of the Board, stated in substance 
that the Board's discretion is absolute; it is constitution-
ally vested with sole and absolute power to determine 
allowance or disallowance of claims. 
11 Article IV, Section 18, Idaho Constitution. 
12Article V, Section 107, Nevada Constitution. 
13State ex rel Hansen v. Parsons, 57 Ida. 775, 69 P. 2d 788, 793 ( 1937). 
14Gem Irrigation District V. Gallet, 43 Ida. 519, 253 Pac. 128 ( 1927). 
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The Idaho Supreme Court, in another case, 15 said 
the following concerning the powers of the Examiners: 
''The Constitution creates the State Board of Ex-
aminers as a tribunal with full power and juris-
diction to pass upon all claims against the state, 
except those specifically excepted by the Constitu-
tion, and no court or other tribunal is authorized 
to set aside or reject such action." 
B. Nevada Case. A leading Nevada case on the sub-
ject 16 held in substance that the Legislature has no au-
thority to deprive the Board of Examiners of its duty and 
authority over claims against the state. If the Legis-
lature were allowed to overrule the Board's discretion, 
it would be usurping most of the powers which have been 
constitutionally vested in the Board of Examiners. 
There are, however, two early Nevada cases 1 7 which 
seem to indicate that the Board of Examiners has only 
an advisory capacity to the Legislature; however, these 
cases must be viewed in light of the fact that the Nevada 
Constitution was copied almost directly from the Cali-
fornia Constitution, and the California Constitution 
established a board of examiners by legislative enact-
ment and not by a constitutional provision. 
PoiNT VI. 
WHEN THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS HAS DE-
NIED A CLAIM ON THE GROUND THAT THE 
STATE HAS NO LEGAL OR MORAL OBLIGA-
15 Bargaw v. Gooding, 14 Ida. 288, 94 Pac. 438, 441 ( 1908). 
16State ex rel. Lyon County v. Hallock, 20 Nev. 326, 22 Pac. 123 ( 1889). 
17 Ash v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15, 30, 31 ( 1869); Lewis v. Doran, 5 Nev. 
399, 410 ( 1870). 
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TION TO PAY THE ALLEGED CLAIM, THE LEG-
ISLATURE, BY ALLOWING SUCH A CLAIM, 
WOULD BE GRANTING A SPECIAL PRIVILEGE, 
IMMUNITY OR FRANCHISE TO A PRIVATE 
INDIVIDUAL OR CORPORATION AND, THERE-
FORE, THERE WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF 
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26 (16), UTAH CON-
STITUTION. 
Article VI, Section 26 ( 16) of the Utah Constitution, 
provides: 
''The Legislature is prohibited from enacting any 
private or special laws in the following cases : * * * 
'' 16. Granting to an individual, association or 
corporation any privilege immunity, or franchise.'' 
It would seem that after the Board of Examiners has 
exercised its constitutional duty of considering and acting 
upon claims, and has denied them for the reason that 
there is no legal or moral obligation against the state, 
that the Legislature, in allowing such claims, would be 
granting a special privilege, immunity or franchise to a 
private individual or corporation, and would thus be 
making a void appropriation. In short, the Legislature 
would be making an appropriation of public monies for 
a private purpose and, in essence, would be making a 
gift of public monies to an individual who had no legal or 
moral right to make any claim upon the state. 18 It should, 
therefore, be evident that uniformity of legislation 
should be required to prevent the granting to any person 
or class of persons the privileges or immunities which, 
upon the same terms, do not belong to all persons. 
18State ex f'el. Cashman v. Simms, 43 S. E. 2d 805 (W. Va. 1947). 
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In summary, it would appear that the question of 
whether the Legislature made an appropriation for a 
public or private purpose when it appropriated monies 
to pay the claims of respondents, is a question that must 
be determined by the courts of this state. The language 
of State ex rel. Cashma;n v. Simms, supra, is explicit and 
conclusive on this point. The court, on page 817 of the 
opinion, stated : 
"It is well established that the courts possess the 
power to consider an appropriation of public 
funds to determine whether it is for a public or 
private purpose. That question is not a legislative 
but a judicial function. The Legislature cannot 
make a private purpose a public purpose by its 
mere fiat or declaration.'' 
The court then went on to cite other authority- on this 
point. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Constitution gives the Board of Examiners 
power to examine all claims against the state (except sal-
aries and compensation of officers fixed by la'v), and pro-
vides that no claim shall be passed upon by the Legisla-
ture without having been considered and acted upon by 
the Board. It is evident that the framers of the Utah 
Constitution intended to vest great discretion and power 
over claims in the Board of Examiners, as Utah case law 
as well as the case la" .. of states " .. ith comparable consti-
tutional provisions bears out. 
To allow the Legislature to pass claims " .. hich have 
previously been denied after careful scrutiny by the 
16 
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Board, or to disallow claims which have been allowed by 
the Board, is not only an interference with executive dis-
cretion, which does violence to the whole conception of 
the separation of powers, but also relegates the Board to 
a mere auditing body. Certainly, the framers of the 
Utah Constitution envisioned the Board as something 
more than a body just to audit claims; they were creating 
a Board constituting the three chief elective officials of 
the state to examine, consider and act upon claims. 
The Legislature may pass upon claims heard by the 
Board of Examiners, but the wording of the Constitu-
tion in cases construing it would seem to indicate that 
this is for purposes of appropriation, since only the Leg-
islature can appropriate money to pay claims against the 
state, and this appropriation must be for a valid public 
purpose, not falling within the prohibitions of Article VI, 
Section 26 of the Utah Constitution. 
It should be noted that the Legislature 1s not 
equipped to handle claims for the following reasons: 
'' (1) Adjudication of tort claims often involves 
the consideration of very technical legal questions. 
To cope with these questions requires legal train-
ing and laymen are not suited for this task. (2) 
Legislatures do not have the necessary facilities 
for gathering evidence. (3) Political and personal 
considerations are inherent in the legislative sys-
tem. ( 4) The legislature does not have time ade-
quately to consider each claim. ( 5) The infre-
quency of the legislative sessions results in the 
claimant's having to wait to have his claim heard. 
(6) Because of the growing importance of legis-
lation, the legislators could spend their time more 
17 
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beneficially by devoting it to general bills which 
affect the public welfare.' ' 19 
It is, therefore, respectfully requested that this Hon-
orable Court find and enter its order that the Constitution 
of the State of Utah does not grant to the State Legisla-
ture the power to make appropriations for claims that 
have first been properly considered by the Board of 
Examiners of the State of Utah and denied by such 
Board. 
It is also respectfully requested that this Honorable 
Court find that a writ of mandamus is not the proper 
remedy to bring this action before the Court, there being 
an adequate remedy at law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Deputy Attorney General 
LOUIS H. CALLISTER, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
195 Utah Law Review, 243-244 ( 1956). 
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